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Abstract
Nowadays it is widely accepted to formulate the security of a protocol carrying out a given task via the
“trusted-party paradigm,” where the protocol execution is compared with an ideal process where the outputs
are computed by a trusted party that sees all the inputs. A protocol is said to securely carry out a given task if
running the protocol with a realistic adversary amounts to “emulating” the ideal process with the appropriate
trusted party. In the Universal Composability (UC) framework the program run by the trusted party is called
an ideal functionality. While this simulation-based security formulation provides strong security guarantees,
its usefulness is contingent on the properties and correct specification of the ideal functionality, which, as
demonstrated in recent years by the coexistence of complex, multiple functionalities for the same task as
well as by their “unstable” nature, does not seem to be an easy task.
In this paper we address this problem, by introducing a general methodology for the sound specification
of ideal functionalities. First, we introduce the class of canonical ideal functionalities for a cryptographic
task, which unifies the syntactic specification of a large class of cryptographic tasks under the same basic
template functionality. Furthermore, this representation enables the isolation of the individual properties
of a cryptographic task as separate members of the corresponding class. By endowing the class of canoni-
cal functionalities with an algebraic structure we are able to combine basic functionalities to a single final
canonical functionality for a given task. Effectively, this puts forth a bottom-up approach for the specifica-
tion of ideal functionalities: first one defines a set of basic constituent functionalities for the task at hand,
and then combines them into a single ideal functionality taking advantage of the algebraic structure.
In our framework, the constituent functionalities of a task can be derived either directly or, following
a translation strategy we introduce, from existing game-based definitions; such definitions have in many
cases captured desired individual properties of cryptographic tasks, albeit in less adversarial settings than
universal composition. Our translation methodology entails a sequence of steps that derive a corresponding
canonical functionality given a game-based definition. In this way, we obtain a well-defined mapping of
game-based security properties to their corresponding UC counterparts.
Finally, we demonstrate the power of our approach by applying our methodology to a variety of basic
cryptographic tasks, including commitments, digital signatures, zero-knowledge proofs, and oblivious trans-
fer. While in some cases our derived canonical functionalities are equivalent to existing formulations, thus
attesting to the validity of our approach, in others they differ, enabling us to “debug” previous definitions
and pinpoint their shortcomings.
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1 Introduction
The Universal Composability (UC) framework proposed by Canetti [Can05], culminating a long sequence of
simulation-based security definitions (cf. [GMW87, GL90, MR91, Bea91, Can00]; see also [PW01] for an
alternative framework), allows for arguing the security of cryptographic protocols in arbitrary settings where
executions can be concurrent and adversarially interleaved. The framework is particularly attractive for the
design of secure systems as it supports modular design, provides non-malleability across sessions [DDN00],
and preserves security under composition.
In the UC framework, security is argued by providing a proof that a protocol realizes an ideal functionality
F for the cryptographic task. While this simulation-based formulation provides satisfying security guaran-
tees, its usefulness is contingent on the properties of the realized ideal functionality. In particular, any ideal
functionality is required to interact with an ideal-world adversary to whom it reveals aspects of its internal
state. Thus, such a program can be quite far from an idealization of a given cryptographic task. To make
things worse, the application of the framework to the analysis of many cryptographic schemes has shown that
relatively complex ideal functionality programs are the norm. This has frequently led to successive revisions
of ideal functionality programs, the simultaneous coexistence of multiple different ideal functionalities for the
same task, and the discovery of errors in their specification, which in turn would lead to flawed security guar-
antees for the protocols realizing them. (A quick inspection of recent papers providing UC formulations of
cryptographic tasks should suffice to support the claim about their complexity; see the treatment of digital sig-
natures [Can01, BH04, Can04, Can05] for an example of need-to-revise and error-prone formulations of ideal
functionalities.)
In this paper we address this problem by introducing a general methodology for the sound specification of
ideal functionalities. Following our methodology each task gives rise to a class of ideal functionalities that are
consistent with the cryptographic task in terms of its actions. This representation unifies the syntactic specifi-
cation of a large class of cryptographic tasks under the same basic template functionality, and, furthermore, it
enables the isolation of the individual properties of a cryptographic task as separate members of the correspond-
ing functionality class. This facilitates a fine-grain specification of the basic constituent properties of the ideal
version of a task. At the same time, our methodology provides a way to combine constituent functionalities of
a task to a single “supremum” ideal functionality that encompasses all constituent properties. This amounts to
a bottom-up approach for achieving the original goal of expressing all required properties of a cryptographic
task with a single functionality. This approach can be contrasted with the common “top-down” approach that
specifies an ideal functionality capturing all essential properties at once, and then possibly relaxing it to bring
it closer to realizability, which as argued before has produced unstable results in a number of occasions.
In addition, our methodology makes it easy to incorporate existing formulations of cryptographic proper-
ties for a task in case those have eady been investigated in the form of game-based definitions. While such
definitions provide a less satisfying level of security guarantees (as they may exclude composition, adaptive
corruptions, non-malleability and other properties offered by the UC framework), they are frequently easier to
specify and understand as the appropriate formulations of the natural properties of the underlying cryptographic
task. Examples include the existential unforgeability notion for digital signatures [GMR88], IND-CPA security
for public-key encryption, the hiding property of commitment schemes, and others.
We now summarize our results in more detail.
Our results. First, we introduce the notion of the class of canonical functionalities for a cryptographic task T .
Each member of this class has a simple, concise syntax built around two pass-through communication flows:
one from the environment to the ideal-world adversary and another in the opposite direction. Every crypto-
graphic task is associated to its corresponding canonical functionality class. Next, we define an operation over
this class and show that the class has the algebraic structure of a semilattice which enables the joining of canon-
ical functionalities. This algebraic structure is a unique feature that characterizes our bottom-up functionality
specification approach. It imposes a natural ordering which enables the grading of canonical functionalities
according to the level of security they offer, as well as the combination of more basic functionalities into a sin-
gle final functionality for a task. Furthermore, the syntactic conciseness of our canonical functionalities gives
rise to a well-defined communication (formal) language between the functionality and the other entities in an
ideal-world simulation which is instrumental in our methodology. These results are presented in Section 3.
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The above lays out our methodology for specifying functionalities following a bottom up approach: we first
define basic constituent functionalities for a cryptographic task and then we combine them taking advantage of
the algebraic structure of the canonical functionality class. Next, we turn to the derivation of such constituent
functionalities. These basic functionalities can be derived either directly or, following a translation strategy
we introduce, from existing game-based definitions. Our game-to-functionality translation operates as follows.
We divide games into two general types: consistency games and hiding games. The former capture properties
such as correctness, unforgeability and binding, while the latter capture properties such as IND-CPA security
and commitment hiding. Depending on the type of game we present a sequence of steps that transform a
game-based definition (whenever it exists or it is easily defined) into its corresponding canonical functionality.
We demonstrate the soundness of this translation by showing that any scheme that realizes the resulting ideal
functionality also possesses the properties offered by the game-based definition. (Section 4.)
Finally, we showcase our methodology by applying it to a variety of basic cryptographic tasks, obtain-
ing ideal functionalities for digital signatures, oblivious transfer, commitments and zero-knowledge proofs of
knowledge. In some cases (commitment, zero-knowledge) our derived canonical functionalities are equivalent
to previously proposed functionalities in the literature, something that attests to the soundness of the bottom up
approach; in others (signature and oblivious transfer), our derived canonical functionalities differ from some
previous definitions, allowing us to pinpoint their shortcomings. In fact, this “debugging” goes beyond the
specification of particular tasks, as in the case of oblivious transfer we are able to point to a structural inade-
quacy in the UC notion of “delayed output” in the ideal process. Due to lack of space only the treatment of
signatures and oblivious transfer is presented in the main body (Section 5), while the other tasks, as well as
proofs, the translation of hiding games, and other background material appear in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
We will lay out our results following the Universal Composability framework of Canetti [Can05];see Ap-
pendix A for a review of the basic notions. Recall that in the UC framework, the environment is creating
processes which are entities maintaining state across actions. Further, a cryptographic task T is associated with
an ideal functionality which is a stateful entity. The functionality FT is a “packaging” of the actions of the task
T together with data fields that are persistent across action invocations. For example, an ideal functionality for
the commitment task offers two actions, commit and open, and has a persistent data field that is generated by
the commit action and used by the corresponding open action (the decommitment information). Similarly, an
ideal functionality for the digital signature task offers three actions, key-generation, signature-generation, and
signature-verification, and has a persistent data field produced by the signing action and used by the verification
action (this is the list of messages that have been signed).
Given that the environment is producing all actions for the ideal functionality of a task, not all sequences of
action might be sensible, as the environment is assumed adversarial. Actions that are deemed inconsistent with
the current state are ignored by the ideal functionality. This implicitly determines a notion of “well-formedness”
of action sequences that we will formalize in the next section. Furthermore, the ideal functionality may gen-
erate output to a party depending on its internal state (we call this the “default output” of the functionality to
distinguish it from possibly adversarially generated output). We will also give an explicit formulation of this
mapping of states to outputs in the next section.
Our definitions of well-formedness and default output for a functionality will also require basic string
operations. Given a sequence w consisting of elements from an alphabet Σ = {a1, . . . , ak}, we let wi denote
the i-th element inw. We can obtain a subsequence ofw, call itw′, by erasing some of the elements inw without
disturbing the relative positions of the remaining elements. We denote this byw′ 4 w and we remark that  4 w
for any string w. If Σ′ ⊆ Σ, for any string w ∈ Σ∗ we denote by w|Σ′ the largest subsequence of w that belongs
to (Σ′)∗. For any w ∈ Σ∗ we write w′  w when w′ is derived from w after substituting at least one symbol of
w with the special symbol “−”. Finally, for a given set of strings S we define S = {w′ | ∃w ∈ S : w′  w}.
A monoid (A,+) is a semigroup with an identity element. Any monoid possesses a preorder relation
denoted by . such that a . b iff ∃c : a+ c = b.
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3 Canonical Ideal Functionalities
In this section we provide an explicit syntax for a class of functionalities that idealize the cryptographic task T
— this is the class of canonical functionalities for the cryptographic task T . In this first formulation of canonical
functionalities we focus on a wide class of cryptographic tasks whose action outputs are not required to follow
an ideal probability distribution. Such tasks include digital signatures, commitment, public-key encryption,
secure message transmission, zero-knowledge proofs, secure deterministic function evaluation, etc.
The communication language of ideal functionalities. We start by specifying more explicitly the language
of the communication between the ideal functionality FT of a task T and the environment. The alphabet over
which the environment communicates with the ideal functionality is parameterized by the security parameter
λ ∈ N and is a finite set of symbols of the form (ACTION,P, x); note that we will usually omit reference to λ
for simplicity. Here ACTION is a label that determines the action the environment instructs the functionality to
do (e.g., COMMIT, SIGN, etc.). P is a tuple that designates the identifiers of the entities and their roles in the
particular action (in particular which parties provided the input to the action and which parties should receive
output). To differentiate multiple invocations of the functionality by the same group of entities, P may also
include a session identifier sid . Finally, the value x is an encoding of the input to the action that is polynomial
in λ; note that whenever x = , we will drop x from the symbol notation for ease of reading.
In response to a symbol (ACTION,P, x), the ideal functionality may return (see below in what circum-
stances) a symbol (ACTIONRETURN,P, y) to some party. The set of all symbols of the form (ACTION,P, x)
and (ACTIONRETURN,P, y), constitutes the finite I/O alphabet of the ideal functionality, i.e., the communica-
tion alphabet between the functionality and the environment, and is denoted by ΣT .
As mentioned in Section 2, the actions of a cryptographic scheme might make sense only in certain order;
for this reason not all strings over ΣT are valid as action sequences. To formalize this, we associate with the
ideal functionality the predicate WFT called the well-formedness predicate. For any string w ∈ (ΣT )∗ and
symbol a ∈ ΣT , the well-formedness predicate WFT (w, a) decides whether the string wa is sensible with
respect to the functionality FT .
We also mentioned before that the ideal functionality may produce output based on its internal state and the
current action symbol. This can be more formally captured by a polynomial-time string mapping DOT , called
the default output mapping, that given a string w ∈ (ΣT )∗ and a symbol a ∈ ΣT that satisfies WFT (w, a), will
return a value that is the intended output of the ideal functionality on action symbol a given the history w. In
case no restriction on the output exists the mapping would return the wildcard symbol “∗”. For example, in
the case of a zero-knowledge task T = ZK, upon receiving (PROVE, 〈P, V, sid〉, 〈x,m〉), DOZK will output the
pair 〈x, φ〉 where φ = 1 if and only if 〈x,m〉 belongs to the relation that parameterizes the zero-knowledge
functionality. As an example of the case of the wildcard symbol, in the digital signature task T = SIG,
on action symbol (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉) the mapping DOSIG may output ∗ as there could be no need for the
functionality to impose a restriction on the distribution of the public key pk that is returned in the symbol
(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, pk).
This completes the description of the I/O language (communication between the environment and the ideal
functionality). FT also communicates with an ideal world entity, called the ideal world adversary S. This
interaction defines another communication language that is not bound by the alphabet of the real world. We
next define this language formally. For each input action symbol (ACTION,P, x), the ideal functionality may
want to notify the ideal world adversary. We capture this by introducing a set of “leaking-action” symbols
(LEAKACTION,P, x′) where x′ will have a functional dependency on x according to the program of the ideal
functionality. The default output of the ideal functionality (as defined by the DOT mapping) may also be sent
out with the LEAKACTION symbol to the adversary. Conversely, the ideal world adversary may also com-
municate with the ideal functionality; to capture this interaction we introduce the “influence-action” symbols
denoted by (INFLACTION,P, ·). We restrict such symbols to pertain only to an influence to the output of a
particular action that is currently under-way. Occasionally the adversary may want to provide input to the
functionality that extends beyond the output of a particular action. To capture this type of adversarial influence
we will use symbols of the form (PATCH, ·). Finally, the adversary may inform the functionality that a certain
party is corrupted; for this purpose symbols of the form (CORRUPT, ·) will be used. The extended communi-
cation alphabet of the ideal functionality is denoted by ΣextT and includes all I/O symbols of ΣT as well as the
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corresponding INFLACTION, LEAKACTION,CORRUPT and PATCH symbols.
So far we introduced a syntax for the communication language between the ideal functionality and the other
entities of the ideal world. Next, we will describe a well-defined class of structured ideal functionalities for a
cryptographic task. We call this the class of canonical functionalities for the task.
The canonical functionality of a cryptographic task. The functionalities that we consider in this paper re-
spond to the following design choices: (i) the adversary is notified of all input actions (by means of LEAKACTION
symbols), (ii) the ideal functionality produces output only after being instructed by the adversary through a
INFLACTION symbol (this captures the delayed output property of [Can05]), (iii) the ideal functionality is a
deterministic TM, and (iv) outputs are always given sequentially and thus fairness will not be captured.
A canonical functionality is essentially defined by two functions: suppress() and validate(). As stated in (i)
above, given an action symbol (ACTION,P, x) a canonical ideal functionality will always notify the adversary
about this input. The function suppress() will determine what information about x the ideal world adversary
will learn. The output suppress() will be passed into the LEAKACTION symbol. Specifically, the suppress()
function is defined over (ACTION,P, x) symbols and will output some x′  x. We require that the suppress()
function will always substitute with “−” the same locations of x, independently of x.
Together with a LEAKACTION symbol the adversary will also be given some information relating to the
default output of the ideal functionality. We distinguish two types of default outputs: public and private. When
the default output is public the adversary is allowed to see the output that is meant to be delivered to a party.
On the other hand, if the default output is private, the adversary will be handed a pointer to the value of the
default output. The canonical functionality keeps track of the correspondence between pointers and actual
values and the adversary can take advantage of such pointers by instructing the functionality to “dereference”
them. As examples of a public output, recall the default outputs corresponding to the tasks of zero-knowledge
and commitments in the previous section. Private outputs on the other hand are intrinsic to the cryptographic
tasks of oblivious transfer and secure function evaluation.
The canonical functionality returns output whenever it receives an INFLACTION symbol. In particular
given (INFLACTION,P, y) it will return (ACTIONRETURN,P, y) (in the case of public output) to the party
in P that is supposed to receive output. Similarly, given (INFLACTION,P, y′) where y′ is a pointer it will
return (ACTIONRETURN,P, y) where y is the dereferencing of the pointer y′ (denoted ∗(y′)1) in the case of
private output. Given that not all output influences are consistent with the intended security properties of the
cryptographic task the validate() predicate is defined over strings of Σ∗ and determines when the canonical
functionality will halt.
We note that suppress() is history independent while validate() is not. The intuition is that the suppress()
function abstracts what the adversary learns about the possibly private inputs of parties (i.e., it captures the
hiding aspects of the functionality) whereas the validate() predicate makes sure that the outputs produced by
the functionality are consistent with its history according to the intended consistency properties of the task.
In order to perform the validate check a canonical functionality needs also to maintain state. The state of
the functionality, denoted by history, is the sequence of all I/O symbols ordered chronologically as received
from and sent to the environment. We use historyPj to denote all symbols associated to party Pj in history, i.e.,
the ACTION symbols that were provided by Pj and ACTIONRETURN symbols that were returned to Pj .
The CORRUPT and PATCH symbols are used to handle the behavior of corrupted parties. When a party Pj
is corrupted, we allow the adversary to learn historyPj
2. Moreover, to handle adaptive corruptions, we allow
the adversary to rewrite the history of corrupted parties using the PATCH symbols in the following manner: a
certain symbol that was provided by a corrupted party can be modified provided this symbol has not contributed
to the view of any honest party. To facilitate this checking the canonical functionality will use an array called
binding[·] that for each symbol in history, records the set of honest parties whose view could have been affected
by that symbol.
We now have all the elements to present the exact formulation of the class of canonical functionalitiesFT .
Each member of the class is specified by a pair of functions suppress(), validate() as defined above. We give
the definition in Figure 1, and a pictorial representation can be found in Figure 2.
1 Note the overloading of “∗”, also used as the wildcard output by DOT .
2We also defer the treatment of forward security for now.
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Canonical Functionality F suppress,validateT
Initially, history :=  and binding := .
Upon receiving msg = (ACTIONi,P, x) from some party Pj , if Pj is corrupted set x′ = x else com-
pute x′ ← suppress(msg), set msg ′ ← (LEAKACTIONi,P, x′) and if WFT (historyPj ,msg) = 1 send
〈msg ′,DOT (history,msg)〉 to the adversary S for public output (resp. 〈msg ′,&DOT (history,msg)〉 for pri-
vate output), record msg in history and in case Pj is uncorrupted, set binding[l] = {Pj} where l = |history|;
otherwise ignore msg .
Upon receiving msg = (INFLACTIONi,P, y′) from the adversary S, infer Pj from P, set msg ′ ←
(ACTIONRETURNi,P, y), where y = y′ if y′ is a value, or y = ∗(y′) if y′ is a pointer, and if WFT (historyPj ,
msg ′) = 1 recordmsg ′ in history; otherwise ignoremsg . If validate(history) = 1, then sendmsg ′ to party Pj ;
if Pj is uncorrupted, set binding[k]← binding[k]∪{Pj}, 1 ≤ k ≤ |history|. Otherwise (validate(history) = 0),
if Pj is corrupted remove msg ′ from history (i.e., ignore msg), else send an error symbol to Pj and halt.
Upon receivingmsg = (CORRUPT, Pj) from the adversary S, mark Pj as corrupted, return historyPj to S, and
set binding[k]← binding[k] \ {Pj}, 1 ≤ k ≤ |history|.
Upon receivingmsg = (PATCH, history′) from the adversary S where history′ ∈ (ΣT )|history| do the following:
if binding[k] = ∅ set history[k]← history′[k], 1 ≤ k ≤ |history|.
Figure 1: Definition of the class of canonical functionalities FT for a task T quantifying over all admissible
pairs suppress(), validate().
I/O Environment
Interaction
(Action, x) (ActionReturn, y)
Ideal World
Adversary
Interaction
(LeakAction, x′) (InflAction, y′)
history
FT
validate()suppress()
Figure 2: The canonical functionality: com-
munication flows with the environment and
adversary.
Fbind
FdumCOM
Fhide
realizability
"horizon"
Fcorr
F topCOM
constituent
functionalities
Figure 3: The lattice of canonical functionali-
ties for commitment showing relations between
the constituent functionalities (Appendix C.3).
A canonical functionality defines a language over the symbols that are used by the functionality to commu-
nicate with the environment. We formalize this language as follows:
Definition 3.1. Given a canonical functionalityFT , an environmentZ and an adversary S, we defineLI/OFT ,Z,S ={w|w ∈ (ΣT )∗ such that w is equal to history of FT in an execution with Z and S }.
We may quantify the language over all possible environments Z and ideal world adversaries S in which case
we will omit referencing them. Moreover, we may consider only those strings in history of FT for which the
environment Z returns 1; we will denote this (“bad”) language as BI/OFT ,Z,S .
Algebraic structure of canonical functionality classes. The suppress(), validate() parameterization effec-
tively gives a range of canonical functionalities with security and correctness properties of different strength
for the same cryptographic task. We next endow this class with an algebraic structure that will be helpful in
classifying and combining the various canonical functionalities for the same cryptographic task.
We define a conjunction operation denoted by ∧ on the class of canonical functionalities for a task T .
This operation will enable us to combine canonical functionalities for a task T , provoding at the same time a
concise way of representing members of the class in terms of “simpler” members. Observe that for any two
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members of the canonical functionality class that are parameterized by the functions suppress1 and suppress2,
respectively, for any symbol a = (ACTIONi,P, x), it holds that suppress1((ACTIONi,P, suppress2(a))) =
suppress2((ACTIONi,P, suppress1(a))). This fact will be handy in the definition below.
Definition 3.2 (Conjuncting Functionalities). Given F1 = F suppress1,validate1T ,F2 = F suppress2,validate2T ∈ FT
we define the conjunction F1 ∧ F2 of the two functionalities as the functionality F suppress,validateT ∈ FT ,
where (1) for any a = (ACTION,P, x) ∈ Σ, suppress(a) = suppress1(ACTIONi,P, suppress2(a)), and
(2) validate() = validate1()∧ validate2(), i.e., the logical conjunction of the two validate predicates of F1,F2.
We next show that the canonical functionality class for a task T has a monoid structure with identity element
a canonical functionality that we call the dummy functionality for T defined as follows:
Definition 3.3 (Dummy Functionality). We call the canonical functionality FdumT ∈ FT dummy if (1) for all
x and any ACTION, suppress((ACTION,P, x)) = x, and (2) validate() = 1 always.
Observe that the dummy functionality does not capture any of the intended correctness or security properties of
the cryptographic task T . This means that any protocol pi UC-realizing FdumT will merely syntactically match
the purpose of T but will lack any useful property.
Proposition 3.4. (FT ,∧) is a commutative monoid with the dummy functionalityFdumT as the identity element.
Any commutative monoid has an associated preordering relation denoted by .; in the case of (FT ,∧) we
say that F1 . F2 if and only if there exists F3 such that F2 = F1∧F3. The intuitive interpretation of F1 . F2
is that F2 is at least as strict as F1 from a security point of view.
FT together with ∧ forms a bounded (join-)semilattice, i.e., every set of elements inFT has a least upper
bound. Note that (1) we use∧ in place of the standard∨ in lattice theory as it is more consistent as an operator in
our setting where lattice elements would capture security properties (and going higher in the lattice means that
security increases), and (2) given that (FT ,∧) as a commutative monoid lacks the antisymmetric property, the
semilattice would be in fact over the quotientFT /  where  is the equivalence relation defined as F1  F2
iff F1 . F2 and F2 . F1. We next define the top canonical functionality F topT which can be easily seen to be
the supremum of all canonical functionalities inFT .
Definition 3.5 (Top Functionality). We call the canonical functionality F topT ∈ FT top if for any ACTION,
(1) for all x, suppress((ACTION,P, x)) = (−)|x|, and (2) for all w, validate(wa) = 1 if and only if a =
(ACTIONRETURN,P, y) and DOT (w) ∈ {y, ∗}.
The top canonical functionality represents the most stringent idealization of a cryptographic task. In particular,
the adversary receives no information whatsoever about the inputs of the parties and he can only influence the
functionality by providing the intended outputs. Thus, the only thing the adversary controls is the scheduling
of the I/O actions.
This completes the description of the algebraic structure of the class of canonical functionalities. The lattice
of canonical functionalities for a task can be represented by a directed graph where the F topT is placed at the
top level and FdumT at the bottom. An example of such a lattice for the commitment task is given in Figure 3.
Given the lattice of canonical functionalities we will show that we can identify a level of the lattice as the
“realizability horizon.” We will show that all canonical functionalities at and below this level are realizable (in
the plain model) whereas all canonical functionalities above the level are unrealizable. First we show that all
canonical functionality lattices have a realizability level.
Theorem 3.6. For every task T , there is a protocol pi that UC-realizes the dummy functionality FdumT .
Next, we show that UC-realizing any point F ofFT would imply that any lattice point dominated by F is
also UC-realizable.
Theorem 3.7. If pi UC-realizes F , then pi UC-realizes any F ′ . F .
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The usefulness of the lattice is in the fact that it is natural to identify individual desired properties of the
task, map them to canonical functionalities in the lattice and then use the conjunction operation to derive the
supremum of these lattice points that will yield the final functionality for the task. It should be noted that not
all points in the lattice of canonical functionalities for a cryptographic task are natural embodiments of the task.
In particular, as we already mentioned, FdumT does not capture any security or correctness property; on the
other hand, F topT may be too restrictive and incorporate properties not typically required. Therefore, the final
functionality for a task may lie in between these two extremal points.
4 Deriving Canonical Ideal Functionalities
In this section we outline a methodology for deriving canonical ideal functionalities. Given a cryptographic
task T , the first step is to identify a set of consistency (including correctness) and privacy properties:
Consistency properties are expressed in terms of languages over the I/O alphabet ΣT . In particular one
needs to identify strings over ΣT that violate a certain consistency aspect of the underlying task. Provided
that the set of strings identified is polynomial-time decidable a corresponding canonical functionality is
derived by setting the validate() predicate to reject all strings that violate the consistency property.
Privacy properties are expressed in terms of suppression of input values that accompany action symbols. In
particular, if a certain action a = (ACTION,P, x) is supposed to maintain the privacy of a portion x′ of the
input x, we define suppress(a) to be equal to x with all locations corresponding to x′ substituted by “−”.
Now, using the above guidelines one can define a set of canonical functionalities each one corresponding to
different security or correctness aspects of a cryptographic task. Then, given the canonical functionalities
F1, . . . ,Fk so defined, one can derive the canonical ideal functionality of the cryptographic task by combining
the functionalities as F = F1 ∧ . . . ∧ Fk. In such case we call F1, . . . ,Fk the constituent canonical func-
tionalities of F (note that typically there will be a unique set of natural constituent functionalities although the
functionality may have many different sets of possible constituents). It follows that Fi . F and, based on
Theorem 3.7, we have that any protocol that realizes F also realizes Fi for all i = 1, . . . , k, thus the canonical
ideal functionality F preserves all consistency and privacy properties identified individually in F1, . . . ,Fk.
Depending on the cryptographic task, it may not always be easy to properly identify the required set of con-
sistency and privacy properties that will yield the constituent canonical functionalities of the task. Fortunately,
for many of them substantial effort has been spent in identifying individual security properties formalized in
terms of “security games.” Examples include the unforgeability game of digital signatures [GMR88] and the
IND-CPA game of public key encryption [GM84].
In the remaining of this section we show how one can leverage on existing game-based definitions of a
cryptographic task to derive constituent canonical ideal functionalities in a systematic way. Importantly, our
formal transformation approach from games to functionalities provably maintains the underlying game-based
security notions. This translation methodology can be applied whenever game-based definitions have been
identified. In fact, as we showed in a previous version of this paper [GKZ08] it is possible to specify games for
desired security properties “on demand” and apply the translation methodology to them as well.
4.1 Ideal functionalities from game-based security definitions
Individual correctness and privacy definitions are frequently specified by a game between the attacker and a
“challenger” who controls different aspects of the cryptographic task. The attacker either tries to produce an
undesired sequence of actions or attempts to deduce a hidden bit selected by the challenger. In the former case
we call the interaction a consistency game while in the latter we call the interaction a hiding game. Examples
of properties modeled with consistency games include completeness properties, the unforgeability of digital
signatures, the binding property of commitments, the soundness property of zero-knowledge protocols etc.,
while hiding games are used to model the IND-CPA property for public-key encryption and the hiding property
for commitment schemes. In order to detail our transformation we first provide a formal definition of game
based definitions.
A game-based definition G for a cryptographic task T involves two PPT interactive Turing machines, the
challenger C and the attacker A. The challenger uses the actions of the cryptographic task as oracles. When
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the interaction terminates, a Turing machine called the judge3 J reads the transcript of the interaction as well as
the internal state of the challenger and decides which party won the game. We denote the success probability
of the attacker when playing the game G by SuccGA . It equals the probability of the event that the judge decides
that the attacker wins the game.
Consistency games are restricted to be deterministic programs (note that the task actions invoked by the
game may be probabilistic). We say that a cryptographic scheme that implements a task T satisfies the property
defined by a game G if for all PPT attackers A it holds that SuccGA is a negligible function in λ.
In a hiding game, the attacker focuses on a particular action of the cryptographic task. At some point of
the interaction with the challenger, the attacker provides two input strings x0, x1 for a certain action where
x0 = 〈xL0 , xR0 〉, x1 = 〈xL1 , xR1 〉 such that either the left or the right parts of the strings are required to be
different by the challenger while the other parts are required to be equal (for example in the witness hiding
game for zero-knowledge, xL0 = x
L
1 will be the statement while x
R
0 , x
R
1 will be two distinct witnesses). In
response, the challenger flips a coin b and executes the action that is attacked on input xb. The interaction
provides the output of the action to the attacker who is supposed to provide a guess b∗ for b. The judge decides
that the attacker wins whenever b = b∗. We say that a cryptographic scheme that implements a task T satisfies
the property defined by the hiding game G if for all PPT attackers A it holds that the function |SuccGA − 12 | is a
negligible function in λ.
Ideal functionalities from consistency games. Suppose that G is a consistency game for a cryptographic
task T that involves a challenger C, an attacker A and a judge J. Let Σ be any cryptographic scheme that
implements the task T . Recall that our goal is to obtain a canonical functionality FG ∈ FT such that if a
protocol piΣ UC-realizes any F & FG then the cryptographic scheme Σ satisfies the property defined by the
game G. Our methodology proceeds in three steps: we first define an environment (and also the corresponding
ideal world) based on the game G. Second, based on this environment, we define a language that corresponds
to the event where the attacker wins the game. Third, provided that the language is decidable, we obtain a
canonical functionality by incorporating the language decider as part of the validate() predicate of the canonical
functionality. We describe the three steps in more detail below.
Step 1: Defining the environment and simulator. We first present the transformation from the game G for a
task T implemented by a scheme Σ to the corresponding environment ZAG and the ideal world adversary SΣG .
We say that the transformation is sound, provided that the judge J decides that the attacker wins the game if
and only if the environment ZAG returns 1 in an execution with FdumT and SΣG . More specifically, it holds that
Pr[IDEALFdumT ,ZAG,SΣG(1
λ) = 1] = SuccGA .
First, we describe how we derive the environment ZAG based on the game G. ZAG will simulate both the
attacker A and the challenger C; whenever C makes an oracle call to some action of the task, the environment
ZAG issues the corresponding ACTION symbol. The program of C will be executed by ZAG. (For example,
in the unforgeability game for digital signatures, an oracle call to the key generation operation will result in
issuing the symbol (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉) to a party called S, where S is a random name from the namespace
for some random sid ; subsequent calls by C to the signing oracle for a message m, will result in the symbols
(SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m) directed to the same party S). If the attacker A needs to play the role of some party of the
cryptographic task T , ZAG will need to spawn and corrupt a party and then simulate it according to the operation
of A. In such case, SΣG will mediate the corruption operation between ZAG and the ideal functionality.
Second, we define an ideal world adversary SΣG that will be paired with ZAG. SΣG will interact with ZAG to
corrupt parties if the environment requests it and it will also provide influence action symbols whenever a leak
action symbol occurs following the program of the scheme Σ.
Step 2: Defining the “bad language.” This language will correspond to the event that the attacker wins the
game. It is denoted by BI/OT,G ⊆
⋃
A,Σ L
I/O
FdumT ,ZAG,SΣG
and contains those strings for which the environment ZAG
returns 1. It is easy to see that given the way the transformation of the game G to the environment ZAG was
performed, those strings exactly correspond to the event when the attacker A wins the game G against the
3Typically, the functionality of the judge is incorporated as part of the challenger program; we find it more convenient to specify it
as a separate function.
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challenger C. While this language captures the event that the attacker wins the game, it is not sufficient for
describing the winning event within more complex executions because the bad sequence of symbols may be
interleaved with other actions. To remedy this, we define an extended bad language to be those strings of LI/OFdumT
that contain as a subsequence a string of BI/OT,G, and denote it as B
ext
T,G.
Step 3: Defining the ideal functionality. In order to define the class of canonical functionalities that capture
the game G we need first to show that the extended bad language BextT,G defined in step 2 is polynomial-time
decidable. Then, given the decider D for the language, we define the canonical functionality FG that captures
the game G by requiring that validate(w) = 0 if and only if w ∈ BextT,G; in other words, the function validate()
simulates the decider D, and whenever the decider accepts the functionality halts.
We now show that the translation detailed above is sound. In a similar fashion it is possible to derive
functionalities based on hiding games. We present the corresponding transformation in Section B.
Theorem 4.1. Assume that a scheme Σ implements a task T and G is a consistency game for T . It holds that
if piΣ UC-realizes some F & FG, then Σ satisfies the property defined by G.
5 Applying the Methodology
5.1 Digital signatures
The basic requirements for digital signatures, completeness, consistency and unforgeability, were first formu-
lated in [GMR88]4. Each property is specified by a consistency game. In this section we show how to translate
these traditional notions into the corresponding canonical functionalities. Following Figure 1, any canonical
signature functionality FSIG is defined for two types of roles, the signer S and the verifier V , with three actions,
KEYGEN, SIGN,VERIFY. We denote the canonical signature functionality class asFSIG.
Unforgeability. Here we give a full treatment of unforgeability to exemplify our methodology; due to space
limitations, we only give the bad languages and functionalities corresponding to completeness and consistency,
and defer the full presentation to Appendix C.1.
Definition 5.1 (Unforgeability [GMR88]). A signature scheme Σ(SIG) = 〈gen, sign, verify〉 is unforgeable
if for all PPT A, Pr[(vk, sk)← gen(1λ); (m,σ)← Asign(vk,sk,·)(vk);φ← verify(vk,m, σ) : φ = 1 and A
never submittedm to the sign(vk, sk, ·) oracle ] ≤ negl(λ).
The above definition can be formulated as a consistency game Guf for the task SIG as follows: the chal-
lenger C uses algorithms gen(), sign(), verify() as oracles, and interacts with the adversary A: C queries the
gen() oracle and obtains 〈sk, vk〉, and then sends such vk to A; each time upon receiving m from the A, the
challenger C queries the sign() oracle with m and obtains σ, and then returns σ to A; upon receiving from A
a pair 〈m′, σ′〉, C queries the verify() oracle with 〈m′, σ′, vk〉 and obtains the verification result. The judge J
decides that A wins the game ifm′ has never been queried before and the verification result is 1.
Step 1. Based on the game Guf described above, we can construct an environment ZAuf and the corresponding
ideal world adversary SΣuf as follows. In order to simulate the game, the environment first picks S and V from
the namespace at random as well as a random sid . The environment sends (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉) to party S and
receives (KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk); then the environment simulates A on input vk ; when A queries m
to its signing oracle, the environment sends (SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m) to party S and returns the output of S to A.
Once A outputs a pair 〈m,σ〉, the environment sends (VERIFYRETURN, 〈V, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉) to some party V
and receives the verification result φ. In the case that m has never been queried and φ = 1, the environment
terminates with 1; otherwise with 0.
We next define the ideal-world adversary SΣuf . Each time SΣuf receives (LEAKKEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉) from the
ideal functionality, it runs (vk, sk) ← gen(1λ) and sends (INFLKEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉, vk) to the functionality.
When SΣuf receives (LEAKSIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m) from the ideal functionality, it runs σ ← sign(vk, sk,m), and
sends (INFLSIGN, 〈S, sid〉, σ) to the functionality. When SΣuf receives (LEAKVERIFY, 〈V, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)
4Consistency is implied in the GMR specification, as pointed out by Canetti [Can04].
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from the ideal functionality, it runs φ ← verify(vk, sk,m, σ), and sends (INFLVERIFY, 〈V, sid〉, φ) to the
functionality.
Step 2. For any adversary A and signature scheme Σ we define LI/OFdumSIG ,ZAuf ,SΣuf
(cf. Section 3) with ZAuf ,SΣuf as
defined in step 1. We next define the set of strings BI/OSIG,uf as the subset of
⋃
A,Σ L
I/O
FdumSIG ,ZAuf ,SΣuf
that contains
exactly those strings for which the environment returns 1.
Lemma 5.2. (1)BI/OSIG,uf =
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
w = (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk)
(SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m1)(SIGNRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, σ1) · · ·
(SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,mk)(SIGNRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, σ`)
(VERIFY, 〈V, sid〉, 〈m′, σ′, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V, sid〉, 1)
such thatm′ 6∈ {m1, . . . ,m`}
, and
(2) BI/OSIG,uf is decidable in polynomial time.
In order to obtain the bad language for the unforgeability property we extend BI/OSIG,uf as follows: B
ext
SIG,uf ={
w ∈ LI/OFdumSIG
∣∣∣∃w′ ∈ BI/OSIG,uf s.t. w′ 4 w}. We observe that BextSIG,uf is also decidable in polynomial time.
Step 3. Next we define the class of ideal functionalities that corresponds to the unforgeability property.
Definition 5.3 (Canonical Functionality Fuf ). The functionality Fuf ∈ FSIG equals F suppress,validateSIG , where (1)
suppress() satisfies that for all x and anyACTION ∈ {KEYGEN, SIGN,VERIFY}, suppress((ACTION,P, x)) =
x, (i.e., the same as in FdumSIG ), and (2) validate(w) = 0 if and only if w ∈ BextSIG,uf .
Based on Theorem 4.1, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 5.4. If piΣ(SIG) realizes some F & Fuf , then Σ(SIG) is unforgeable.
Further, we show that for unforgeability the other direction also holds – i.e., the transformation is tight.
Theorem 5.5. If Σ(SIG) is unforgeable, then piΣ(SIG) realizes Fuf .
Completeness. In a similar fashion we apply our translation methodology to the completeness property (see
Section C.1.1), to obtain the bad language:
B
I/O
SIG,comp =
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
w = (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk)
(SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m)(SIGNRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, σ)
(VERIFY, 〈V, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V, sid〉, 0)

The corresponding extended bad language is defined asBextSIG,comp =
{
w ∈ LI/OFdumSIG
∣∣∣∃w′ ∈ BI/OSIG,comp s.t. w′ 4 w}.
Definition 5.6 (Canonical Functionality Fcomp). The functionality Fcomp ∈ FSIG equals F suppress,validateSIG ,
where (1) suppress() satisfies that for all x and anyACTION ∈ {KEYGEN, SIGN,VERIFY}, suppress((ACTION,
P, x)) = x, (i.e., the same as in FdumSIG ), and (2) validate(w) = 0 if and only if w ∈ BextSIG,comp.
Consistency. In a similar fashion we we obtain the bad language for consistency:
B
I/O
SIG,cons =
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
w = (VERIFY, 〈V1, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V1, sid〉, φ1)
(VERIFY, 〈V2, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V2, sid〉, φ2)
such that φ1 6= φ2

The corresponding extended bad language is defined asBextSIG,cons =
{
w ∈ LI/OFdumSIG
∣∣∣∃w′ ∈ BI/OSIG,cons s.t. w′ 4 w}.
We observe that BextSIG,cons is decidable in polynomial time.
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Definition 5.7 (Canonical Functionality Fcons). The functionality Fcons ∈ FSIG equals F suppress,validateSIG , where
(1) suppress() satisfies that for all x and anyACTION ∈ {KEYGEN, SIGN,VERIFY}, suppress((ACTION,P, x))
= x, (i.e., the same as in FdumSIG ), and (2) validate(w) = 0 if and only if w ∈ BextSIG,cons.
The canonical ideal signature functionality. The (canonical) ideal signature functionality FSIG = Fuf ∧
Fcomp ∧ Fcons and is shown in Figure 4. In light of Theorem 3.7 we obtain the following:
Corollary 5.8. If piΣ(SIG) realizes some F & Fuf ∧Fcomp ∧Fcons, then the signature scheme Σ(SIG) satisfies
the game-based properties of unforgeability, completeness, and consistency.
Canonical Signature Functionality FSIG
Actions: KEYGEN, SIGN,VERIFY (public output).
Well-formedness (WFSIG): Any (SIGN, 〈S, sid〉, ·) symbol must be preceded by a (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉) symbol.
Default Output (DOSIG): For all w,
(1) DOSIG(w, (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)) = ∗,
(2) DOSIG(w, (SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m)) = ∗, if w has a single KEYGEN symbol of the form (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉).
(3)DOSIG(w, (VERIFY, 〈V, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)) = 1 ifw contains (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk)
(SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m)(SIGNRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, σ), else:
DOSIG(w, (VERIFY, 〈V, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)) = 0 ifw contains (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk).
Suppress and Validate: (1) suppress() satisfies that for all x and any ACTION ∈ {KEYGEN, SIGN,VERIFY},
suppress((ACTION,P, x)) = x, (2) validate(w) = 1 iff w 6∈ BextSIG,uf and w 6∈ BextSIG,comp and w 6∈ BextSIG,cons.
Figure 4: Ideal functionality for digital signature based on the canonical functionality template.
Comparison to previous signature functionalities. As shown in Section C.1, the canonical functionality FSIG
from Figure 4 is UC-equivalent to the digital signature ideal functionality of [Can04] (refer to Remark C.13).
Nevertheless our canonical functionality capturing the consistency property as described above is derived (cf.
Section C.1.2) from a game-based definition for consistency that is different from the one in [Can04]. The
reason is that the consistency formulation given there falls short of capturing the intended properties for the
digital signature task in the UC setting. We elaborat on this issue below.
Recall that a first rendering of FSIG [Can01] failed to capture the consistency property, as pointed out
in [BH04]. The latter work, however, did not capture consistency fully either as was in turn pointed out in
[Can04], which performed a thorough investigation between the correspondence of the game-based security
formulation of the Goldwasser et al. [GMR88] notion for digital signatures and the FSIG ideal functionality.
Indeed, a correspondence theorem was shown in [Can04] establishing that any digital signature scheme secure
in the GMR sense would result in a UC-secure signature protocol.
However, as we now show with the help of our methodology, this correspondence does not stand. In fact,
when one applies our translation methodology to the three game-based definitions that are put forth in [Can04]
to capture the [GMR88] notion of security, the resulting functionality is not the FSIG functionality as defined
above. This is due to the fact that the consistency game as defined in [Can04] (cf. page 12, Definition 1)
assumes an honest key generation. More specifically, if our consistency game translation is applied to that
game, it results in the following bad language (see Lemma C.7):
(BI/OSIG,cons)
′ =
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
w = (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk)
(VERIFY, 〈V1, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V1, sid〉, φ1)
(VERIFY, 〈V2, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V2, sid〉, φ2)
such that φ1 6= φ2

It follows that the corresponding canonical functionality F ′cons would have a validate predicate that checks
for verification inconsistency only in the case that a KEYGEN symbol has been recorded in the history of the
functionality. This is too restrictive as it precludes corrupted signers that may never register a KEYGEN symbol
with the functionality (and in fact this is exactly the issue pointed out in [Can04] regarding the previous work
of [BH04]).
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It is easy to see that the resulting (weaker) canonical functionality F ′SIG = Fuf ∧ Fcomp ∧ F ′cons resides at
a lower point compared to FSIG in theFSIG lattice. This is due to the fact that BextSIG,cons ⊇ (BextSIG,cons)′ where
(BextSIG,cons)
′ is the extended bad language that corresponds to the bad language (BI/OSIG,cons)′. Furthermore, as
shown in Remark C.11, it is possible to design a digital signature scheme Σ′ so that its corresponding protocol
piΣ′ UC-realizes F ′SIG but fails to realize FSIG. This scheme passes the game-based formulation in [Can04]
and, based on our methodology, it will UC-realize F ′SIG; nonetheless, FSIG will not be realized by this digital
signature. As a result, the appropriate formulation of the consistency game (from which we derive the language
B
I/O
SIG,cons) is the one presented in Definition C.6, and this provides the exact game-based correspondence to the
FSIG canonical functionality.
5.2 Oblivious transfer
We consider the 1-out-of-2 version of oblivious transfer [Rab81, EGL85, Cre´87]. The FOT functionality is
defined for two roles, the sender S and the receiver R. The actions, well-formedness and default output of FOT
are given in Figure 5. We next describe the three constituent canonical functionalities of oblivious transfer that
correspond to its three basic properties: correctness, sender privacy and receiver privacy.
Correctness. In order to obtain the bad language for correctness, we observe that for every two messages
(m0,m1) from the sender and every selection bit i from the receiver, the value the receiver obtains should be
equal tomi. Based on this, we identify the set of strings that are inconsistent with the correctness property as:
B
I/O
OT,corr =
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
w = abc or bac
where a = (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉, 〈m0,m1〉),
b = (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, R〉, i),
c = (TRANSFERRETURN, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, R〉,m′),
such thatm′ 6= mi

The corresponding extended bad language is BextOT,corr =
{
w ∈ LI/OFdumOT
∣∣∣ ∃w′ ∈ BI/OOT,corr such that w′ 4 w }.
Observe that BextOT,corr is decidable in polynomial time. Now the correctness class can be defined:
Definition 5.9 (Canonical Functionality Fcorr). The functionality Fcorr ∈ FOT equals F suppress,validateOT , where
(1) suppress() satisfies that for all x, suppress((TRANSFER,P, x)) = x, (i.e., the same as in FdumOT ), and (2)
validate(w) = 0 if and only if w ∈ BextOT,corr.
Sender privacy. In order to capture sender privacy, we modify suppress() to withhold the sender’s input from
the adversary. This results in the following canonical functionality:
Definition 5.10 (Canonical Functionality Fssec). The functionality Fssec ∈ FOT equals F suppress,validate, where
(1) validate() = 1 always, and (2) suppress(a) = (−)|m0|+|m1|, for a = (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉, 〈m0,m1〉).
Receiver privacy. Similarly, we capture receiver privacy by suppressing the receiver’s input:
Definition 5.11 (Canonical Functionality Frsec). The functionality Frsec ∈ FOT equals F suppress,validate, where
(1) validate() = 1 always, and (2) suppress(a) = (−)|i|, for a = (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, R〉, i).
Based on the above, we obtain the canonical functionality FOT = Fssec ∧ Frsec ∧ Fcorr, see Figure 5.
Comparison to previous OT functionalities. As shown in Section C.2, FOT from Figure 5 is UC-equivalent to
the oblivious transfer functionality as defined in [CLOS02], but different from the corresponding functionality
given in [Can05]. We elaborate on this below, which highlights a larger issue in the way ideal functionalities
interact with the adversary in the UC framework.
In [Can05], the notion of “delayed output” was introduced as a mechanism to enable the ideal-world ad-
versary to delay the output of a certain action any amount time necessary to make the view of the environment
indistinguishable to the real world’s. This is important, as failing to provide such capability to the adversary
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Canonical Oblivious Transfer Functionality FOT
Action: TRANSFER (private output).
Well-formedness (WFOT): Any TRANSFERRETURN symbol should be preceded by a TRANSFER symbol.
Default Output (DOOT): For all w, DOOT(w, (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, R〉, i)) = mi if w contains (TRANSFER,
〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉, 〈m0,m1〉) and DOOT(w, (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉, 〈m0,m1〉)) = mi if w contains (TRANSFER,
〈〈S,R, sid〉, R〉, i).
Suppress and Validate: (1) suppress() satisfies that for all x suppress((TRANSFER,P, x)) = , and (2)
validate(w) = 1 if w 6∈ BextOT,corr.
Figure 5: Ideal functionality for oblivious transfer based on the canonical functionality template.
may enable an impossibility result due to the existence of environments that can tell the real world from the
ideal by simply observing the failure of the simulator to “synchronize” with the protocol flow in the real world.
Now, while the delayed output artifact successfully serves functionalities such as zero-knowledge and com-
mitments (that turn out to be identical to our corresponding canonical versions), that is not the case for obliv-
ious transfer. This is due to the fact that the basic action in oblivious transfer requires the input contribution
from both the sender and the receiver prior to producing output. This asks for a more finely grained inter-
action between the ideal functionality and the ideal-world adversary. In our setting this is captured by the
LEAKTRANSFER symbols that are sent to the adversary whenever a TRANSFER symbol is submitted by either
the sender or the receiver (and note that none of these symbols produce output to the receiver).
In contrast, in the OT functionality of [Can05] such notifications are handled with two delayed outputs,
something that forces the ideal functionality to wait when the receiver’s input is submitted in case the sender
has not submitted his input yet (cf. [Can05], Figure 25, page 108). Effectively, this induces an impossibility
result for protocols where the receiver is supposed to send the first message in the OT protocol: in such case the
environment can distinguish the real world from the ideal world by activating the receiver without activating
the sender and observing the network communication. This would not affect our canonical formulation of the
OT functionality that notifies the ideal world adversary using the LEAKTRANSFER symbols whenever either
party provides input.
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A The Universal Composability Framework
The UC framework was proposed by Canetti for defining the security and composition of protocols [Can01].
In this framework one first defines an “ideal functionality” of a protocol, and then proves that a particular
implementation of this protocol operating in a given computational environment securely realizes this ideal
functionality. The basic entities involved are n players P1, . . . , Pn, an adversary A, and an environment Z .
The real execution of a protocol pi, run by the players in the presence of A and an environment machine Z ,
with input z, is modeled as a sequence of activations of the entities. The environment Z is activated first,
generating in particular the inputs to the other players. Then the protocol proceeds by having A exchange
messages with the players and the environment. Finally, the environment outputs one bit, which is the output
of the protocol.
The security of the protocols is defined by comparing the real execution of the protocol to an ideal process
in which an additional entity, the ideal functionality F , is introduced; essentially, F is an incorruptible trusted
party that is programmed to produce the desired functionality of the given task. The players are replaced by
dummy players, who do not communicate with each other; whenever a dummy player is activated, it forwards
its input to F . Let A denote the adversary in this idealized execution. As in the real-life execution, the output
of the protocol execution is the one-bit output of Z . Now a protocol pi securely realizes an ideal functionality
F if for any real-life adversary A there exists an ideal-execution adversary S such that no environment Z , on
any input, can tell with non-negligible probability whether it is interacting with A and players running pi in
the real-life execution, or with S and F in the ideal execution. More precisely, if the two binary distribution
ensembles, REALpi,A,Z and IDEALF ,S,Z , describing Z’s output after interacting with adversary A and play-
ers running protocol pi (resp., adversary S and ideal functionality F), are computationally indistinguishable
(denoted REALpi,A,Z
c≈ IDEALF ,S,Z ). For further details on the UC framework refer to [Can05].
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B Ideal Functionalities from Hiding Games
Let G be a hiding game for a cryptographic task T . We show how to define a canonical functionality for the
task that implies the hiding property. In this case, our methodology proceeds in two steps: we first define an
environment and an ideal world simulator based on the game G. Second, based on the environment’s operation
we define the canonical functionality by appropriately modifying the suppress function.
Step 1: Defining the environment and simulator. As in the case of consistency games, we define an
environment ZAG and simulator SΣG based on the operation of the challenger C, the attacker A, the judge J and
the scheme Σ. The transformation is identical to the one in step 1 in Section 4.1.
Step 2: Defining the canonical functionality. During any execution of the environment ZAG with SΣG , it
holds that the environment issues an ACTION symbol with input xb where b is a random bit selected by ZAG
and x0, x1 were provided by the attacker A (which is simulated by ZAG). Assuming that x0 = 〈xL0 , xR0 〉 and
x1 = 〈xL1 , xR1 〉 and the game G contains the test xL0 = xL1 and xR0 6= xR1 , we define the suppress function for
symbol a = (ACTION,P, xb) where b ∈ {0, 1} by suppress(a) = 〈xLb , (−)|x
R
b |〉 (recall that suppress(a)  xb).
Theorem B.1. Suppose that a cryptographic scheme Σ implements a cryptographic task T and G is a hiding
game for T . Then it holds that if piΣ UC-realizes some F & FG, then Σ satisfies the hiding property defined by
game G.
C Applying the Methodology: Other Tasks
C.1 Digital signatures (cont’d)
Here we present the full treatment of the completeness and consistency properties.
C.1.1 Completeness
Definition C.1 (Completeness). A signature scheme Σ(SIG) = 〈gen, sign, verify〉 is complete if for all PPT
A,
Pr[m← A(1λ); (vk, sk)← gen(1λ);σ ← sign(vk, sk,m);φ← verify(vk,m, σ) : φ = 0] ≤ negl(λ).
The above definition can be modeled as a consistency game, Gcomp as follows. The challenger C uses
algorithms gen(), sign(), verify() as oracles, and interacts with completeness attacker A: after receiving m
produced by A, the challenger C queries the gen() oracle and obtains sk, vk; then C queries the sign() oracle
with sk,m and obtains σ; later C queries the verify() oracle with 〈m,σ, vk〉 to obtains the verification result.
The judge J decides that A wins the game if the verification result is 0.
Step 1. Based on the game Gcomp described above, we can construct an environment ZAcomp and the cor-
responding ideal world adversary SΣcomp. The environment ZAcomp here is similar to the environment ZAuf ;
the environment first picks S and V from the namespace at random as well as a random sid . The environ-
ment simulates A with input 1λ and obtains m; it then sends (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉) to party S and receives
(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk) from the party S; later the environment sends (SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m) to party S
and receives σ; the environment inputs (VERIFYRETURN, 〈V, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉) to V and receives the verifica-
tion result. If the verification result φ = 0, the environment terminates with 1; otherwise with 0. The adversary
SΣcomp is defined similarly to the adversary SΣuf in the previous section.
Step 2. For any completeness attacker A and scheme Σ, the environment ZAcomp, the adversary SΣcomp, and the
dummy canonical signature functionality together give rise to the language LI/OFdumSIG ,ZAcomp,SΣcomp
. We consider
the subset of strings BI/OSIG,comp of the union of all the I/O languages quantified over all possible completeness
attackers A and schemes Σ that contains exactly those strings for which the environment returns 1. Formally,
B
I/O
SIG,comp
def=
⋃
A,Σ
L
I/O
FdumSIG ,ZAcomp,SΣcomp
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We next prove the following characterization of this language as well as determine its time complexity:
Lemma C.2. (1) BI/OSIG,comp =
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
w = (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk)
(SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m)(SIGNRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, σ)
(VERIFY, 〈V, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V, sid〉, 0)

(2) BI/OSIG,comp is decidable in polynomial time.
In order to obtain the bad language for the completeness property we extend BI/OSIG,comp as follows:
BextSIG,comp =
{
w ∈ LI/OFdumSIG
∣∣∣ ∃w′ ∈ BI/OSIG,comp s.t. w′ 4 w }
We observe that BextSIG,comp is also decidable in polynomial time.
Step 3. We now define the class of ideal functionalities that corresponds to the completeness property.
Definition C.3 (Canonical Functionality Fcomp). The functionality Fcomp ∈ FSIG equals F suppress,validateSIG ,
where (1) suppress() is the same as in FdumSIG , and (2) validate(w) = 0 if and only if w ∈ BextSIG,comp.
The following corollary follows from Theorem 4.1.
Corollary C.4. If piΣ(SIG) realizes some F & Fcomp, then Σ(SIG) is complete.
The other direction also holds in this case:
Theorem C.5. If Σ(SIG) is complete, then piΣ(SIG) realizes Fcomp.
C.1.2 Consistency
Definition C.6 (Consistency). A signature scheme Σ(SIG) = 〈gen, sign, verify〉 is consistent if for all PPT
A,
Pr[(vk,m, σ)← A(1λ);φ1 ← verify(vk,m, σ);φ2 ← verify(vk,m, σ) : φ1 6= φ2] ≤ negl(λ).
The above definition can also be modeled by a consistency game, Gcons, as follows. The challenger C uses
algorithms gen(), sign(), verify() as oracles, and interacts with the consistency attacker A: C simulates A
on input 1λ to obtain 〈vk,m, σ〉 and then calls the the verify() oracle with 〈m,σ, vk〉 twice and obtains the
verification results φ1 and φ2 respectively. The judge J decides that A wins the game if the two verification
results are different, i.e., φ1 6= φ2.
Step 1. Based on the game Gcons described above, we can construct an environment ZAcons and the cor-
responding ideal world adversary SΣcons as follows. The environment first picks S and two V ’s from the
namespace at random as well as a random sid . Then the environment simulates A to obtain 〈vk,m, σ〉 and
gives the symbols (VERIFY, 〈V1, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉) and (VERIFY, 〈V2, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉) to obtain the symbols
(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V1, sid〉, φ1) and (VERIFYRETURN, 〈V2, sid〉, φ2). In the case that φ1 6= φ2, the environ-
ment terminates with 1 otherwise with 0. SΣcons is defined similarly to SΣuf .
Step 2. For any consistency attacker A and scheme Σ, the environment ZAcons, the ideal adversary SΣcons, and
the dummy canonical signature functionality together give rise to the language LI/OFdumSIG ,ZAcons,SΣcons
. We consider
the subset of strings BI/OSIG,cons of the union of all the I/O languages quantified over all possible consistency
attackers A and schemes Σ that contains exactly those strings for which the environment returns 1. Formally,
B
I/O
SIG,cons
def=
⋃
A,Σ
L
I/O
FdumSIG ,ZAcons,SΣcons
We next prove the following characterization of this language as well as determine its time complexity:
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LemmaC.7. (1)BI/OSIG,cons =
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
w = (VERIFY, 〈V1, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V1, sid〉, φ1)
(VERIFY, 〈V2, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V2, sid〉, φ2)
such that φ1 6= φ2
,
and (2) BI/OSIG,cons is decidable in polynomial time.
In order to obtain the bad language for the consistency property we extend BI/OSIG,cons as follows:
BextSIG,cons =
{
w ∈ LI/OFdumSIG
∣∣∣ ∃w′ ∈ BI/OSIG,cons s.t. w′ 4 w }
We observe that BextSIG,cons is also decidable in polynomial time.
Step 3. We proceed next to define the canonical functionality that corresponds to the consistency property.
Definition C.8 (Canonical FunctionalityFcons). The functionalityFcons ∈ FSIG equalsF suppress,validateSIG , where
(1) suppress() is the same as in FdumSIG , and (2) validate(w) = 0 if and only if w ∈ BextSIG,cons.
The following corollary also follows from Theorem 4.1: corollary:
Corollary C.9. If piΣ(SIG) realizes some F & Fcons, then Σ(SIG) is consistent.
In the case of consistency, the other direction also holds:
Theorem C.10. If Σ(SIG) is consistent, then piΣ(SIG) realizes Fcons.
Remark C.11. We first recall the definition of consistency as given in [Can04]. We call it “weak consistency”
as it restricts the adversary by requiring honest key generation.
Definition C.12. A signature scheme Σ(SIG) = 〈gen, sign, verify〉 is weakly consistent if for all PPT
attackers A,
Pr
[
(vk, sk)← gen(1λ); (m,σ)← Asign(vk,sk,·)(vk);
φ1 ← verify(vk,m, σ);φ2 ← verify(vk,m, σ) : φ1 6= φ2
]
≤ negl(λ).
We now construct a counterexample Σ′ which satisfies completeness, unforgeability and weak consistency
as defined above, but in which the corresponding piΣ′ does not realize FSIG in [Can04] (or the FSIG that is
produced from our translation methodology).
Let Σ be a scheme that satisfies completeness, unforgeability and weak consistency. We modify such Σ
into Σ′: (1) prepend a bit b to the verification key; if b = 0 then the verification procedure remains the same;
if b = 1 then the verification procedure accepts its input message-signature pair with probability 1/2; (2)
the key generation algorithm returns a verification key starting with bit 0. Notice that Σ′ still satisfies the
three properties, completeness, unforgeability and weak consistency, since the honest key generation will never
return a verification key starting with bit 1. According to Theorem 2 in [Can04], the corresponding piΣ′ would
realize FSIG. This, however, does not hold. When the signer is corrupted at the beginning of the execution,
a verification key vk′ with starting bit 1 can be chosen and then two verification requests with the same input
〈m,σ, vk′〉 will return different verification results with non-negligible probability—1/2 in this case.
Remark C.13. Both Canetti’s [Can04] FCanSIG and our canonical signature functionalityFSIG can be realized
by a signature protocol where the underlying signature scheme is CMA-secure, i.e., satisfies unforgeability,
correctness, and consistency (cf. Section 5.1 and Section C.1).
The two functionalities by themselves are equivalent in the UC sense. This can be done by showing that
the dummy protocol in the FSIG-hybrid world realizes unconditionally FCanSIG as well as the dummy protocol
in the FCanSIG -hybrid world realizes unconditionally our FSIG. The proof requires the construction of two ideal
world simulators, one that interacts with the ideal functionality FSIG and simulates the view of any environ-
ment operating in the FCanSIG hybrid world as well as a simulator that interacts with the functionality FCanSIG and
simulates the view of any environment that operates in the FSIG hybrid world. The proof is very similar to
the corresponding proof regarding the oblivious transfer primitive given in Section C.2 where we demonstrate
that our canonical oblivious transfer ideal functionality is UC equivalent to that of [CLOS02]); we refer to that
section for more details.
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C.2 Oblivious transfer (cont’d)
Here we show that our functionality FOT = Fcorr ∧ Fssec ∧ Frsec is equivalent to the one in [CLOS02], call it
FCLOSOT (refer to page 23, Figure 1 in [CLOS02]; we consider 1-out-of-2 OT here). First some observations.
Note that in the CLOS setting, the adversary is allowed to know all the communication between the functionality
and the dummy parties except for the secret information, and it is in charge of message delivery. (Note also
that “... and (sid) to S,...” is redundant because the simulator is allowed to learn the header of the message.)
Further, the Corrupt item is not explicitly shown in their functionality.
To show the equivalence, we consider the “dummy” protocol pidummy, which just forwards the input/output
communication between the functionality and the environment, and we show that pidummy in the FCLOSOT -hybrid
world (resp., FOT-hybrid world) realizes functionality FOT (resp., FCLOSOT ).
First we show the first direction, i.e., that pidummy in theFCLOSOT -hybrid world realizes functionalityFOT. We
need to construct a simulator S such that no Z can tell with non-negligible probability whether it interacts
with A and pidummy in the FCLOSOT -hybrid world or with S and FOT. The simulator S invokes a copy of A
internally, and simulates forA the interaction with Z and the protocol pidummy in the FCLOSOT -hybrid world.
In the case that no party is corrupted, whenever S receives (LEAKTRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉) symbol
from the “outside” functionalityFOT (which means the functionality has an input (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉,
〈x0, x1〉) from the dummy sender), S sends (sender, sid , ·) to the internally simulatedFCLOSOT ; note thatA
is allowed to see (sender, sid) but not its contents. Whenever S receives (LEAKTRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉,
R〉) from the FOT (which means the functionality has an input (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, R〉, i) from the
dummy receiver), S sends (receiver, sid , ·) to the simulated FCLOSOT ; note again that A can read the
header (receiver, sid) but not the contents of the message. Now S simulates the inside functionality
to send (sid , ·) to the internally simulated receiver; again, note that A can read (sid) but not the content.
WheneverA delivers the command (sid , ·), S sends the outside functionality the symbol (INFLTRANSFER,
〈〈S,R, sid〉, R〉, y), where y is the pointer obtained from the default output.
Next we discuss the cases where corruptions occur. Whenever A corrupts a party by sending a cor-
ruption command (Corrupt, S), S sends (CORRUPT, S) to the outside functionality FOT. As a result, the
outside functionality will return historyS to S and also S will be removed from the binding array, which
means that S will be allowed to revise some part in history; note that such a revision should not vio-
late the correctness restrictions defined by the extended bad languages (otherwise the validate predicate
will trigger an error symbol which immediately would cause the simulation to fail). S reads historyS and
if (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉, 〈x0, x1〉) has been recorded, then it simulates the inside functionality to
reveal (x0, x1) to A. In the case that A further supplies a pair (x′0, x′1), and no (sid , ·) has been deliv-
ered to the receiver, S by using (PATCH, history), will revise (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉, 〈x0, x1〉) into
(TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉, 〈x′0, x′1〉); we note that the symbol (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉, 〈x0, x1〉) is
allowed to be revised because the corresponding binding is empty given that party S is corrupted. Further,
we note that at the moment the (sid , ·) is delivered to the internal receiver, S will send a INFLTRANSFER
symbol to the outside functionality, and a TRANSFERRETURN symbol will be returned to the environment
as described above. Now, although (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉, 〈x0, x1〉) is not marked, for the sake of
the simulation, S will not revise this symbol into (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉, 〈x′0, x′1〉), as otherwise the
correction restriction would be violated.
Next we consider case when the receiver is corrupted. Whenever A sends a command (Corrupt, R)
to the inside functionality, S sends (CORRUPT, R) to the outside functionality FOT. Now the outside
functionality returns historyS to S and S will be removed from the binding array, and accordingly, S will
be allowed to revise some parts of history; based on historyS , S reconstructs the receiver’s input and output
and simulates the inside functionality to reveal such input and output to A.
This completes the construction of the simulator. We note that the simulation is perfect.
We now show the other direction, i.e., that pidummy in the FOT-hybrid world realizes FCLOSOT . We again need
to construct a simulator S such that no Z can distinguish the two worlds with non-negligible probability.
The construction is very similar to the one above. The simulator S invokes a copy of A internally, and
simulates for A the interaction with Z and pidummy in the FOT-hybrid world. S interacts with the outside
functionality FCLOSOT .
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In the case of no corruptions, wheneverZ inputs (sender, sid , x0, x1) to the dummy sender, S delivers
the input to the outside functionality and learns the header (sender, sid), and it simulates the inside func-
tionality FOT to send (LEAKTRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉) to A. Whenever Z inputs (receiver, sid , i) to
the dummy receiver, S delivers the input to the outside functionality and learns the header (receiver, sid).
Now the functionality returns (sid , xi) for the receiver, and further it simulates the inside functionality FOT
to send (LEAKTRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, R〉) to A. If both are received, then the default output, which is
a pointer pt will be sent to A. Whenever A returns (INFLTRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, R〉, pt) to the inside
functionality, S delivers (sid , xi), which is produced by the outside functionality, to the receiver.
Next we discuss the cases when corruptions occur. Whenever A corrupts a party by sending a corrup-
tion symbol (CORRUPT, S), S sends (Corrupt, S) to the outside functionality FCLOSOT . Now the outside
functionality will return (x0, x1) if there is an input (sender, sid , x0, x1). S can construct historyS based
on (x0, x1) and return it toA. Similarly, wheneverA sends out (CORRUPT, R), S can issue a (Corrupt, R)
command and learn the receiver’s input and output, and based on them construct historyR for A. In the
case that the sender is corrupted and no output has been received by the receiver, historyS can be revised
into (TRANSFER, 〈〈S,R, sid〉, S〉, 〈x′0, x′1〉); note that this would not violate the correctness restriction.
Now S operates as follows: S holds the input (receiver, sid , i) and until receives the revised information
(x′0, x′1) from A; then S delivers (receiver, sid , i) to the outside functionality and obtains the response
which will be (sid , x′i), and S delivers it to the receiver.
This concludes the simulation, and the simulation is perfect.
C.3 Commitments
Following Figure 1, any canonical functionality for commitment, FCOM, is defined for two types of roles, the
committer C and the verifier V , with two actions, COMMIT and OPEN. TheWF predicate and DOCOM mapping
for FCOM are defined in Figure 6. Based on these functions the dummy functionality FdumCOM is defined (cf.
Definition 3.3).
C.3.1 Correctness
In order to obtain the bad language for correctness, we observe that any committed value that is opened to
should be accepted. Based on this, we identify the set of strings that are inconsistent with the correctness
property as follows:
B
I/O
COM,corr =
{
w
∣∣∣∣ w = (COMMIT, 〈C, V, sid〉,m)(COMMITRETURN, 〈C, V, sid〉)(OPEN, 〈C, V, sid〉)(OPENRETURN, 〈C, V, sid〉, 〈m, 0〉)
}
The bad language can further be extended as: BextCOM,corr = {w ∈ LI/OFdumCOM | ∃w
′ ∈ BI/OCOM,corr such that w′ 4 w}.
The class of ideal functionalities that corresponds to the correctness property can now be defined as follows:
Definition C.14 (Canonical Functionality Fcorr). The functionality Fcorr ∈ FCOM equals F suppress,validateCOM ,
where (1) suppress() is the same as in FdumCOM , and (2) validate(w) = 0 if and only if w ∈ BextCOM,corr.
C.3.2 Binding
The binding property basically states that any committed value that is opened to a different one should not be
accepted. Based on this, we identify the set of strings that are inconsistent with the binding property as follows:
B
I/O
COM,bind =
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
w = (COMMIT, 〈C, V, sid〉,m)(COMMITRETURN, 〈C, V, sid〉)
(OPEN, 〈C, V, sid〉)(OPENRETURN, 〈C, V, sid〉, 〈m′, 1〉)
such thatm 6= m′ for somem,m′

which can be extended as: BextCOM,bind = {w ∈ LI/OFdumCOM
∣∣∣ ∃w′ ∈ BI/OCOM,bind such that w′ 4 w }. We now define
the class of ideal functionalities that corresponds to the binding property.
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Definition C.15 (Canonical Functionality Fbind). The functionality Fbind ∈ FCOM equals F suppress,validateCOM
where (1) suppress() is the same as in FdumCOM , and (2) validate(w) = 0 if and only if w ∈ BextCOM,bind.
C.3.3 Hiding
For this property there is a natural hiding game. We apply our translation methodology to the game to obtain
the corresponding ideal functionality class.
Definition C.16 (Hiding). A commitment scheme Σ(COM) = 〈commit, verify〉 is hiding if for all PPT at-
tackers A = (A1,A2), it holds that Pr[(m0,m1, st) ← A1(1λ); b r← {0, 1}; (c, ξ) ← commit(mb); b∗ ←
A2(st , c) : b∗ = b ∧m0 6= m1] ≤ 12 + negl(λ).
The above definition can be modeled as a hiding game Ghide for the task COM as follows. The challenger
C is allowed to use algorithms commit(), verify() as oracles, and interacts with the attacker A = (A1,A2).
First A1 produces a tuple 〈m0,m1〉, wherem0 6= m1. In response, the challenger randomly chooses a bit b and
queries the commit() oracle with mb to obtain 〈c, ξ〉. Then, C sends c to A2 to obtain b∗ as a guess of b. The
judge J decides that A wins the game if b∗ = b. We next proceed to apply the methodology in Section B.
Step 1. We construct an environment ZAhide and the corresponding ideal world adversary SΣhide based on the
game Ghide described above. In order to simulate the game, the environment first picks C, V from the names-
pace at random as well as a random sid . Then it requests the corruption of the party V and simulates A1 on input
1λ. Once A1 produces 〈m0,m1〉,ZAhide flips a random coin b, gives toC the symbol (COMMIT, 〈C, V, sid〉,mb)
and waits for the transmission from C to V that contains the commitment c. Then, ZAhide simulates A2 on input
c to obtain b∗ and terminates with 1 if and only if b = b∗ and m0 6= m1. The ideal world adversary SΣhide,
whenever it receives (LEAKCOMMIT, 〈C, V, sid〉,m), executes commit() on m and communicates the output
of the protocol to the environment (similarly, it simulates the real world in any other respect).
Step 2. Based on the environment ZAhide we define the functionality class that corresponds to the hiding game:
Definition C.17 (Canonical Functionality Fhide). The functionality Fhide ∈ FCOM equals F suppress,validate,
where (1) validate() = 1 always, and (2) suppress(a) = (−)|m| for a = (COMMIT, 〈C, V, sid〉,m).
Based on Theorem B.1, we have the following corollary:
Corollary C.18. If piΣ(COM) realizes some F & Fhide, then Σ(COM) satisfies hiding.
We note that in this case the converse of the above theorem does not hold as hiding is not sufficiently strong
to imply the UC-realization of Fhide.
C.3.4 The canonical commitment functionality
The (canonical) ideal commitment functionality FCOM = Fcorr ∧ Fbind ∧ Fhide, is instantiated in Figure 6,
based on the canonical functionality template. FCOM is also the top functionality in the commitment lattice
(recall Figure 3).
Canonical Commitment Functionality FCOM
Actions: COMMIT and OPEN (public output).
Well-formedness (WFCOM): symbols COMMITRETURN should be preceded by COMMIT, OPENRETURN preceded by
OPEN, OPEN by COMMIT, and OPENRETURN by COMMITRETURN.
Default Output (DOCOM): for all w, we have two cases (1) DOCOM(w, (COMMIT, 〈C, V, sid〉,m)) = , and (2)
DOCOM(w, (OPEN, 〈C, V, sid〉)) = m if w contains (COMMIT, 〈C, V, sid〉,m).
Suppress and Validate: (1) suppress() satisfies that for all m suppress((COMMIT,P,m)) = , and
suppress((OPEN,P)) = , and (2) validate(w) = 1 if w 6∈ BextCOM,corr and w 6∈ BextCOM,bind.
Figure 6: Ideal functionality for commitment based on the canonical functionality template.
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Remark C.19. FCOM can be shown to be equivalent (in the sense of UC-emulation) to the commitment function-
ality as it appears in [Can05], in a way similar to the one used to show the equivalence between our canonical
OT functionality and the one in [CLOS02]. As such, FCOM is unrealizable in the plain model. Interestingly,
the pairwise conjunction of its constituent functionalities is in fact realizable. We leave the specification of the
corresponding protocols as an exercise.
C.4 Zero-knowledge proofs
Following Figure 1, the canonical functionality for zero-knowledge [GMR89, BG92], FRZK, is defined for two
types of roles, the prover P and the verifier V , with a single action PROVE. We denote the zero-knowledge
proof functionality class as FRZK. (Sometimes we omit the reference to R in the notation for simplicity.) The
WFZK predicate for FRZK, requires that a PROVE symbol should precede PROVERETURN. The default output
DOZK returns 〈x, φ〉 whenever (PROVE, 〈P, V, sid〉, 〈x,w〉) is in the history, where φ = 1 if and only if 〈x,m〉
belongs to the relation that parameterizes the zero-knowledge task, and φ = 0 otherwise. Based on the above
the dummy functionality FdumZK is defined (cf. Definition 3.3).
C.4.1 Completeness
In order to obtain the bad language for completeness, we observe that any (x,m) ∈ R should be accepted; the
set of strings that are inconsistent with the completeness property are as follows:
B
I/O
ZK,comp =
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
w = (PROVE, 〈P, V, sid〉, 〈x,m〉)
(PROVERETURN, 〈P, V, sid〉, 〈x, 0〉)
such that (x,m) ∈ R

We further extend BI/OZK,comp as follows: B
ext
ZK,comp =
{
w ∈ LI/OFdumZK
∣∣∣ ∃w′ ∈ BI/OZK,comp such that w′ 4 w }. The
class of ideal functionalities that corresponds to the completeness property is as follows:
Definition C.20 (Canonical Functionality FRcomp). The functionality FRcomp ∈ FRZK equals F suppress,validateZK
where (1) suppress() is same as in FdumZK , and (2) validate(w) = 0 if and only if w ∈ BextZK,comp.
C.4.2 Soundness
In order to obtain the bad language for soundness, we observe that any (x,m) 6∈ R should not be accepted;
therefore, the set of strings that are inconsistent with the completeness property are:
B
I/O
ZK,sound =
w
∣∣∣∣∣∣
w = (PROVE, 〈P, V, sid〉, 〈x,m〉)
(PROVERETURN, 〈P, V, sid〉, 〈x, 1〉)
such that (x,m) 6∈ R

We extend BI/OZK,sound as follows: B
ext
ZK,sound =
{
w ∈ LI/OFdumZK
∣∣∣ ∃w′ ∈ BI/OZK,sound such that w′ 4 w }. We next
define the class of ideal functionalities for soundness:
Definition C.21 (Canonical Functionality FRsound). The functionality FRsound ∈ FRZK equals F suppress,validateZK
where (1) suppress() is same as in FdumZK , and (2) validate(w) = 0 if and only if w ∈ BextZK,sound.
We note that the soundness notion that FRsound captures is the “strong” one, as stipulated by the knowledge
extraction property.
C.4.3 Zero-knowledge
To capture the zero-knowledge property, we suppress the input from the prover; based on the template in
Figure 1, we obtain the following functionality.
Definition C.22 (Canonical Functionality FRzk). The functionality FRzk ∈ FRZK equals F suppress,validate, where
(1) validate() = 1 always, and (2) suppress(a) = (−)|x|+|m| for a = (PROVE, 〈P, V, sid〉, 〈x,m〉).
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C.4.4 The canonical ideal ZK functionality
The ZK functionality equals FRcomp ∧ FRsound ∧ FRzk, which turns out to be equivalent (in the sense of UC-
emulation) to the zero-knowledge functionality as it appears in [Can05]. As in the case of commitments, this
functionality is the top functionality in the ZK lattice.
Canonical Zero-Knowledge Functionality FRZK
Action: PROVE (public output).
Well-formedness (WFZK): Symbols PROVERETURN should be preceded by PROVE.
Default Output (DOZK): For all w, DOZK(w, (PROVE, 〈P, V, sid〉, 〈x,m〉)) = 〈x, φ〉, where φ = 1 iff (x,m) ∈ R
and φ = 0 otherwise.
Suppress and Validate: (1) suppress() satisfies that for all statement-witness pair (x,m), suppress((PROVE,
P, 〈x,m〉)) = , and (2) validate(w) = 1 if w 6∈ BextZK,comp and w 6∈ BextZK,sound.
Figure 7: Ideal functionality for zero-knowledge, based on the canonical functionality template.
D Proofs
(Proof of Theorem 3.6). Consider a task T , and its well-formedness predicate WFT . We construct a scheme
Σ that implements T such that piΣ realizes the dummy functionality FdumT . We first give description for piT ,
then we design the scheme Σ; the protocol piΣ will be obtained by implementing all actions of piT with the
algorithms of Σ. A piT entity P maintains an array history, initially empty, which is used to record the entity’s
action symbols. In particular, when P receives a symbol (ACTION,P, x) from the environment, it records
the symbol into its history, runs the predicate WFT over history, and if the predicate returns 0, then the input
is ignored, and the input will be removed from its history. Whenever required by the action, the piT entity
returns an output symbol (ACTIONRETURN,P, y), using the WFT predicate to ensure well-formedness. We
next describe the scheme Σ implementing the cryptographic task T . Recall that for each action T specifies a
domain and range; given that we are only interested in designing a protocol realizing the dummy functionality
we will simply define each action of Σ to map every input of the action domainD(λ)i to an element of the action
range R(λ)i . This captures the case of a non-interactive action. For interactive actions, say between two parties,
Σ provides a two party protocol where the two parties coordinate according to the input-output behavior of the
action. This completes the description of Σ that together with piT defines the protocol piΣ.
Next, we construct an ideal world adversary S such that no environment Z can distinguish an execution
involving piΣ and the real world adversary from an execution of FdumT and the ideal world adversary. The
construction of S is as follows: S will simply perform a faithful simulation of the real world execution with
the protocol piΣ and the real-world adversary. This is possible as the canonical dummy functionality relays
all (valid) I/O from the environment without any modifications. We next prove that no environment Z can
distinguish the ideal from the real world for the above simulator S and in fact the simulation is perfect.
Observe that the only difference between the real world execution and the ideal world execution is the
fact that the verification of the well-formedness predicate in the real world is distributed amongst the parties
whereas in the ideal world it is handled by the canonical functionality. Observe that if the combined history of
all parties in an ideal world execution is well-formed then the local history of each party in the real world will
also be well-formed (as the sameWFT predicate is used globally and locally and the predicate is only sensitive
in the order of symbols). Note that the reverse direction is not necessarily true; indeed a set of well-formed local
histories may not be composed to a global history that is well-formed (and this may provide an opportunity for
an adversarial environment to distinguish the real from the ideal world). Nevertheless, this is not the case due to
the fact that a Σ scheme, specifically the coordination component of the protocol implementation of interactive
actions, will ensure that the composition (according to the real order of events as induced by the adversary) of
the local histories of all parties in a real world execution will result in a well-formed global history.
In the case of corrupted parties observe that the composed global history of a real world execution might
cease to be well-formed as it may not include the local histories of corrupted parties (which are handled in-
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ternally by the adversary). This discrepancy, however, will not result in any distinguishing advantage as the
simulator S has the power to insert symbols in the canonical functionality’s history that follow the actions of
corrupted parties and thus maintain the well-formedness of the functionality’s history.
Based on the above we conclude that the ideal world adversary S is performing a perfect simulation of the
ideal world when interacting with FdumT and thus piΣ is a UC-realization of FdumT .
(Proof of Theorem 3.7). Let pi be a protocol that UC-realizes F and let F ′ be any functionality such that F ′ .
F which means that F = F ′∧F ′′ for some F ′′ ∈ FT . Let F ′ = F suppress1,validate1T ,F ′′ = F suppress2,validate2T ∈
FT . To prove the theorem, it suffices to prove the following statement that any protocol pi that UC-realizes F
also UC-realizes F ′.
To prove that pi UC-realizes F ′, we need to show that for any A′ there is an ideal world adversary S ′ such
that for all Z ′, IDEALF ′,S′,Z′ ≈ REALpi,A′,Z′ . Notice that based on the condition that protocol pi realizes F ,
for any A there is an ideal world adversary S such that for all Z , IDEALF ,S,Z ≈ REALpi,A,Z .
Given a real world adversary A′ for the protocol pi, there exists an S from the premise of the theorem that
simulates it in the ideal world interacting with F . We construct an S ′ that interacts with F ′ as follows: S ′ sim-
ulates S in its interface with the functionality F ′ with the following modification: each time when F ′ has input
a = (ACTION,P, x) it gives to the adversary the symbol (LEAKACTION,P, x1) where x1 = suppress1(a);
given this symbol, S ′ computes x2 = suppress2(ACTION,P, x1) and gives the symbol (LEAKACTION,P, x2)
to S. This completes the description of S ′.
Given an environment Z ′ we will show that IDEALF ′,S′,Z′ ≈ REALpi,A′,Z′ . From the premise of the
theorem we know that IDEALF ,S,Z′ ≈ REALpi,A′,Z′ , thus it suffices to show IDEALF ,S,Z′ ≈ IDEALF ′,S′,Z′ .
To each run of F with S and Z ′ we can correspond a run of F ′ with S ′ and Z ′; observe that the corre-
spondence will preserve the history of the canonical functionality, i.e., the history of F in the run with S and
Z ′ will be the same in the corresponding run of F ′ with S ′ and Z ′ (the environment is the same in both cases
and S ′ operates identically to S in terms of the way it influences the functionality). Thus, given that the event
that validate2(history) = 0 happens with negligible probability over all runs of F with S and Z ′ (since this a
real world simulation and whenever this event happens the functionality F returns an error symbol), it follows
that it also happens with negligible probability over the runs of F ′ with S ′ and Z ′. Consider the event that
Z ′ returns 1 over all runs of F with S and Z ′ and observe that its probability is the same to the event that
Z ′ returns 1 over all runs of F ′ with S ′ and Z ′ where both events are taken over the conditional space where
validate2(history) = 1. Given that validate2(history) = 0 is a negligible probability event in either space the
proof of the theorem follows.
(Proof skeleton of Theorem 4.1). By contradiction, assume scheme Σ does not satisfy the property defined by
game G. This means there exists an attacker A winning the game. To finish the proof, we need to present an
environment Z which can distinguish the real from the ideal world with non-negligible probability. Based on
the successful attacker A, we use Z = ZAG as defined in step 1 in Section 4.1. Note that in the real world, A is a
successful attacker against the schemeΣ, so Z outputs 1 with non-negligible probability. However in the ideal
world, the winning case would cause any canonical functionality F & FG to halt, so the environment Z can
never output 1. Therefore the constructed Z distinguishes the two worlds with non-negligible probability. This
finishes the proof.
(Proof of Lemma 5.2). (1) Denote by Y the language in the right hand side of the lemma’s statement (1). First
we need to show BI/OSIG,uf ⊆ Y . Let w be any string in BI/OSIG,uf ; then it holds that there exist A,Σ such that w
equals the history string in the ideal world execution of the environmentZAuf with adversary SΣuf and the dummy
functionality FdumSIG . Based on the definition of the environment ZAuf and the adversary SΣuf , we know that the
symbols (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk)(SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m1)(SIGNRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, σ1) · · ·
(SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,mk)(SIGNRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, σ`)(VERIFY, 〈V, sid〉, 〈m′, σ′, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V, sid〉, 1)
will be recorded into history in the dummy functionality. It follows that the string w belongs to the set Y .
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Second we need to showBI/OSIG,uf ⊇ Y . Letw be any string in Y . We will constructA,Σ such that in the ideal
world execution of ZAuf with adversary SΣuf and the dummy functionality FdumSIG it holds that history = w. Given
that w ∈ Y , there exist string w = (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk)(SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m1)
(SIGNRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, σ1) · · · (SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,mk)(SIGNRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, σ`)(VERIFY, 〈V, sid〉, 〈m′, σ′, vk〉)
(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V, sid〉, 1). Define gen output 〈vk, sk〉. Define sign that upon input mi returns σi for
1 ≤ i ≤ `; Define A output 〈m′, σ′〉; Define verify that upon input 〈m′, σ′, vk〉 returns 1. It follows im-
mediately that the history string that in the ideal world execution of ZAuf with adversary SΣuf and the dummy
functionality FdumSIG would equal w.
(2) It is easy to show the language BI/OSIG,uf is decidable.
(Proof of Theorem 5.5). Given that no forger A can win the unforgeability game above, we need to show that
there exists a adversary S such that no Z can distinguish the two worlds. The adversary S is designed as the
generic adversary for signature task.
Assume piΣ(SIG) cannot realize Fuf , i.e. for all S there exists an environment Z can distinguish the two
worlds with non-negligible probability. We construct A by simulating a copy of Z inside; and A further simu-
lates the real world for the copy of Z .
We let F denote the event that in a run of piΣ(SIG) with Z , signer is honest, verification key vk is produced
by the signer,m is not signed by the signer, and 〈vk,m, σ〉 is valid. Observe that if event F does not occur, the
simulated Z cannot distinguish the two worlds. However, based on assumption above, Z can distinguish the
two worlds with non-negligible probability, which means event F must occur with non-negligible probability,
i.e., A is a successful forger.
(Proof skeleton of Theorem B.1). By contradiction, assume Σ does not satisfy the hiding property defined by
G, i.e., there exists a successful attacker A who can guess the hidden bit b with non-negligible probability
higher than 1/2. Now we need to construct an environment that distinguish the real from the ideal world with
non-negligible probability. Based on the successful attacker A, we use Z = ZAG as defined. Notice that in
the real world, the protocol transcripts will be based on the bit B, and given A is a successful attacker, Z will
output 1 with probability bounded away from 1/2 by a non-negligible fraction; on the other hand, in the ideal
world for any canonical functionality F & FG, since any such functionality will suppress “sensitive” part of
the input which stops b from the adversary S; now no matter how the adversary S is designed (note that S has
adversarial role in this proof), the simulated protocol transcripts will be independently of b, therefore even an
unbounded A will not be able to influence the output based on b. It follows that Z will output 1 with probability
1/2. It follows that Z distinguishes the two worlds with non-negligible probability.
(Proof of Lemma C.2). (1) Denote by Y the language in the right hand side of the lemma’s statement (1). First
we need to show BI/OSIG,comp ⊆ Y . Let w be any string in BI/OSIG,comp; then it holds that there exist A,Σ such
that w equals the history string in the ideal world execution of the environment ZAcomp with adversary SΣcomp
and the dummy functionality FdumSIG . Based on the definition of the environment ZAcomp and the adversary
SΣcomp, we know that the symbols (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk)(SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m)
(SIGNRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, σ) (VERIFY, 〈V, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V, sid〉, 0)will be recorded into
history in the dummy functionality. It follows that the string w belongs to the set Y .
Second we need to show BI/OSIG,comp ⊇ Y . Let w be any string in Y . We will construct A,Σ such that in the
ideal world execution ofZAcomp with adversary SΣcomp and the dummy functionalityFdumSIG it holds that history =
w. Given thatw ∈ Y , there existw = (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk)(SIGN, 〈S, sid〉,m)
(SIGNRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, σ)(VERIFY, 〈V, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V, sid〉, 0). Define gen output
〈vk, sk〉. Define sign that upon input m returns σ; Define A output 〈m,σ〉; Define verify that upon input
〈m,σ〉 returns 0. It follows immediately that the history string that in the ideal world execution of ZAcomp with
adversary SΣcomp and the dummy functionality FdumSIG would equal w.
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(2) It is easy to show the language BI/OSIG,comp is decidable.
(Proof of Theorem C.5). Given that no attacker A can win the completeness game above, we need to show that
there exists an ideal world adversary S such that no Z can distinguish the two worlds. The adversary S is
designed as the generic adversary for the signature task (that performs a simulation of the real-world).
Assume piΣ(SIG) cannot realize Fcomp, i.e. for all S there exists an environment Z can distinguish the
two worlds with non-negligible probability. We construct A by simulating a copy of Z inside; and A further
simulates the real world for the copy of Z . The adversary A will output the plaintextm that corresponds to the
following event F :
F is defined as the event that in a run of piΣ(SIG) withZ , an honest signer, the verification key vk is produced
by the signer, m is signed by the signer into σ based on the vk, and 〈vk,m, σ〉 verifies to 0. Observe that if
the event F does not occur, the simulated Z cannot distinguish the two worlds. However Z can distinguish
the two worlds with non-negligible probability, which means that the event F must occur with non-negligible
probability, i.e., A is a successful completeness attacker.
(Proof of Lemma C.7). (1) Denote by Y the language in the right hand side of the lemma’s statement (1). First
we need to show BI/OSIG,cons ⊆ Y . Let w be any string in BI/OSIG,cons; then it holds that there exist A,Σ such that
w equals the history string in the ideal world execution of the environment ZAcons with adversary SΣcons and the
dummy functionality FdumSIG . Based on the definition of the environment ZAcons and the adversary SΣcons, we
know that the symbols (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk)(VERIFY, 〈V1, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)
(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V1, sid〉, φ1)
(VERIFY, 〈V2, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V2, sid〉, φ2) where φ1 6= φ2 will be recorded into history
in the dummy functionality. It follows that the string w belongs to the set Y .
Second we need to show BI/OSIG,cons ⊇ Y . Let w be any string in Y . We will construct A,Σ such that
in the ideal world execution of ZAcons with adversary SΣcons and the dummy functionality FdumSIG it holds that
history = w. Given that w ∈ Y , there exist string w = (KEYGEN, 〈S, sid〉)(KEYGENRETURN, 〈S, sid〉, vk)
(VERIFY, 〈V1, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN, 〈V1, sid〉, φ1)(VERIFY, 〈V2, sid〉, 〈m,σ, vk〉)(VERIFYRETURN,
〈V2, sid〉, φ2) with φ1 6= φ2. Define gen output 〈vk, sk〉. Define A output 〈m,σ〉; Define verify that upon
input 〈m,σ, vk〉 returns φ1 for the first time and φ2 for the second time. It follows immediately that the history
string that in the ideal world execution of ZAcons with adversary SΣcons and the dummy functionality FdumSIG would
equal w.
(2) It is easy to show the language BI/OSIG,cons is decidable.
(Proof of Theorem C.10). Given that no attacker A can win the consistency game above, we need to show that
there exists an ideal world adversary S such that no Z can distinguish the two worlds. The adversary S is
designed as the generic ideal world adversary (that performs a simulation of the real-world).
Assume piΣ(SIG) cannot realize Fcons, i.e., for all S there exists an environment Z that can distinguish the
two worlds with non-negligible probability. A operates by simulating a copy of Z in the real world; it returns
m,σ, vk based on an event F as defined below.
We let F denote the event that in a run of piΣ(SIG) withZ , the same tuple 〈vk,m, σ〉 is verified with different
results in two verifications. Observe that if event F does not occur, the simulated Z cannot distinguish the two
worlds. However Z can distinguish the two worlds with non-negligible probability, which means event F must
occur with non-negligible probability, i.e., A is a successful consistency attacker.
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